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Conflicts Problems in International
Bills of Lading:
Validity of "Negligence" Clauses
Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos*
Introduction
For almost a century, bills of lading clauses relieving the
shipowner from liability for negligence have been the subject of
a spectacular conflict. In countries where cargo interests domi-
nated, "negligence" clauses' were declared invalid; in other
countries, where hull interests prevailed, such clauses were given
effect under the cover of an almost unlimited freedom of con-
tracting.2 By the end of the past century, the world was divided
into shippers' countries and carriers' countries ;3 and the do-
mestic policy was frequently carried into the international field
by the adoption of conflicts rules safeguarding the application
of domestic standards to bills of lading involving international
contacts.4 Thus, due to varying domestic standards and conflicts
*Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Clauses aiming at exonerating the carrier from liability for negligence are
commonly called "negligence" clauses. See KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW Or
OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 120 (1953).
2. See COLE, THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT 11 (1937) ; SCAIEL, LA
NOUVELLE LEGISLATION 1UR LES TRANSPORTS DES MARCHANDISES PAR MER 14
(1936) ; SAIJVAGE, LA LEGISLATION NOUVELLE SUR LES TRANSPORTS MARITIMES
DES MARCHANDISES 1 (1937); AUBURN, LES TRANSPORTS DES MARCHANDISES
PAR MER 3 (1938) ; KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 119.
3. E.g., England and France were predominantly "carrier-countries," while the
United States was a "shipper's country." See SCAPEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at
21; GRAVESON, BILLS OF LADING AND THE UNIFICATION OF MARITIME LAW IN
THE ENGLISH COURTS, IN CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS
57, 59 (1949); ASTLE, SHIPOWNERS' CARGO LIABILITIES AND IMMUNITIES 2
(1951). See also Avis de M. Ramadier, Chambre, Annexe No. 3500 p. 968 ("There
are shippers' nations . . . and carriers' nations") ; RIPERT, LA RESPONSABILITt
DES PROPRIPTAIRES DE NAVIRES ET L'UNIFICATION Du DROIT MARITIME, D.M.F.
703 (1954). There was also a conflict between shippers' lawyers and carriers'
lawyers. See Ripert, La Loi Francaise du 2 Avril 1986 sur le Transport des
Marchandiaes par Mer, RIVISTA DE DIRITTO DELLA NAVIGAZIONE 367 (1936);
Wiistendirfer, Gutachten iber die Versehlechterung der Rechtslage der Reeder
durch die Hanger Regeln, HANSA 929, 931 (1928) ; GRAMM, DAS NEUE DEUTSCHE
SEEFRACHTRECHT NACH DEN HAAGER REGELN 73 (1938) ; KNAUTH, Op. Cit. supra
note 1, at 119; COLE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13.
4. There was thus a conflict of substantive rules and a conflict of choice of
law rules. See 1 RIPERT, DROIT MARITIME 255 (1952) ; PLAISANT, LES RkGLES
DE CONFLIT DES LOIS DANS LES TRAiTtS 3 (1945). Where the doctrine of free-
dom of contracting prevailed, as in France and Great Britain, the parties were
given freedom to select the applicable law; where limitations were imposed on
[6091
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
rules, the same clause inserted into an international bill of
lading could be valid in one country and invalid in another, and
the liability of the carrier could vary with the fortuitous or
selected forum. 5 As a result, an untenable situation was created:
security in international transactions was minimized, the nego-
tiability of bills of lading was imperiled, and world trade was
seriously hampered.0
The United States, having first succeeded in reaching a com-
promise between the conflicting interests of carriers and ship-
pers in its domestic law,7 took the lead in urging a uniform
international regulation of the carriers' liability." The need for
such regulation was generally felt, and action was taken by in-
terested business groups and international institutions.9 After
several decades of preparatory work, the movement for uni-
formity culminated in an international convention "for the uni-
fication of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading," signed
in Brussels, on August 25, 1924.10
Most of the maritime nations, including the United States,
have ratified or adhered to the Brussels Convention;" others,
the carrier's right to exonerate himself from liability for negligence, as in the
United States, the forum law was declared applicable as a matter of law to all
contracts concluded or performed within the forum jurisdiction. See SAUVAGE,
MANUEL PRATIQUE DU TRANSPORT DES MARCHANDISES PAR MER 7 (1955);
MARAIS, LES TRANSPORTS INTERNATIONAUX DE MARCHANDISES PAR MER ET LA
JURISPRUDENCE EN DROIT COMPARP 5 (1949); COLINVAUX, THE CARRIAGE OF
GOODS BY SEA ACT 1 (1954) ; GRAVESON, op. cit. 8upra note 3, at 64; infra notes
19, 24.
5. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 120, 121, 122 (1947 ed.) ; 2 RIPERT,
DROIT MARITIME 796 (1929 ed.).
6. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 120; ASTLE, SHIPOWNERS' CARGO
LIABILITIES AND IMMUNITIES 7 (1951).
7. See note 29 infra.
8. See GRAVESON, supra note 3, at 59; KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 118.
9. On the history of the movement for unification see, STOEDER, GESCHICTE
DER KONNOSSEMENTSKLAUSELN (1954) ; DOE, BILL OF LADING CLAUSES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION OF BRUSSELS 13 (1956); SCRUTTON, CHARTER-
PARTIES 453 (1955) ; CARVER, CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA 164 (1952) ; Ripert,
La Oonf~rence Diplomatique de Bruxelles, 2 DOR 49 (1923) ; La Commission de
Bruxelles, 4 DOa 55 (1923); FALCONBRIDGE, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 396 (1954);
KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 107 (1947 ed.).
10. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, TREATY SERIES 17 (1931). This agreement was the
result of the combined efforts of the International Law Association and of the
Conference on Maritime Law. The International Law Association at its Hague
meeting of 1921 agreed on a body of rules known as the "Hague Rules, 1921"
(30th Report, II, 254-256). These rules were initially intended to be incorporated
in bills of lading by agreement; subsequently, they were recommended as a basis
of domestic legislation by the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law (Brussels,
October 1922). The rules were amended in Brussels by a committee appointed by
the Conference, and finally, the Convention was signed on August 25, 1924.
11. See list, COLINVAUX, Op. Cit. supra note 4, at 182; KNAUTH, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 453.
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without adhering, have enacted domestic legislation incorpor-
ating the rules agreed upon in Brussels.' 2 However, this sub-
stantial uniformity of domestic legislation' s has not eliminated
the conflicts problems arising in the determination of validity
of negligence clauses inserted into bills of lading involving in-
ternational contacts. 4 The area of application of the (uniform)
forum law,' 5 as well as choice of law rules, differ from country
to country; and depending on the place of litigation, the same
bill of lading may or may not be subject to the Brussels Con-
vention16 even where the forum is in a signatory country and
the contract of affreightment involves contacts with another
signatory country. 17 It seems therefore that, as in the past, a
negligence clause may be given effect in one country and denied
effect in another, contrary to both the letter and the spirit of
the Brussels Convention.'8
12. See list, COLINVAUX, op. cit. supra note 4, at 153.
13. The uniformity is neither general nor complete. Not all maritime nations
have signed, ratified, or adhered to the Brussels Convention; and those which
became party to this agreement, failed, as a rule, to comply with it in all respects.
Conflicts between texts incorporating the uniform rules into national legal systems
are frequent. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 147; GRAVESON, supra note 3;
at 62; Diena, Principes du Droit International Privd Maritime, in 51 A.D.I.R.C.
409, 414 (1935) ; Comment, Ocean Bills of Lading and Some Problems of Conflict
of Laws, 58 COL. L. REV. 212 (1958) ; The St. Joseph [1933] P. 119, 134 ("The
nations have not adopted a uniform system of applying the Hague Rules. Most
nations have not embodied them in their law at all, others differ in the way they
have adopted them. . . . It is somewhat alarming to contemplate how many doors
to confusion in mercantile business are opened by these attempts to legislate for
the whole world").
14. Cf. Diena, supra note 13, at 414. Conflicts may effectively be avoided only
by unification, and universal adoption, of an entire branch of law. And even in
that case conflicts problems may arise, unless the uniform law is interpreted uni-
formly in all countries. See 1 RIPERT, DROIT MARITIME 73 (1950) ; SCAPEL, Op.
cit. supra note 2, at 108; BONECAssE, LE DROIT COMMERCIAL MARITIME 374
(1931) ; Stoeder, supra note 9, at 96. See also International Law Association,
30th Report II, p. 42 (1922) ; Sir Norman Hill, International Shipping Confer-
ence, REPORT 45 (1921) ; Joint Parliamentary Committee, REPORT 130 (1930);
Stag Line v. Foscolo, Mango and Co. [1932] A.C. 328, 342, 350. The Brussels
Convention has not eliminated conflicts: it unified only "certain rules" applicable
to a "fraction" of the entire contract of affreightment; and these unified rules
have been interpreted in a most uniform way. Cf. note 13 supra.
15. Due to varying conceptions with regard to the method of unification
employed by the Brussels Convention, the area of application of the uniform rules
as forum law differs from country to country; and this is so not only where the
uniform rules are voluntarily adopted, but also where incorporated to discharge
an international obligation assumed by signing and ratifying the Convention. Cf.
2 RIPERT, DROIT MARITIME 261 (1952) ; The St. Joseph, supra note 13.
16. Cf. COLINVAUX, Op. Cit. supra note 4, at 115; CARVER, op. cit. supra note
9, at 209.
17. This was the very purpose of the Brussels Convention. Cf. notes 6, 9,
supra; GRAVESON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 60; FALCONREIDGE, op. cit. supra note
9, at 396.
18. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 161 et seq. The usual method em-
ployed by carriers is: deliberate failure to comply with the legislation at the place
of issue of the bill of lading, exacting the insertion of a clause paramount incor-
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
It is the purpose of this paper to define the law applied by
American courts to negligence clauses contained in international
bills of lading. A historical survey of the United States legisla-
tion, and a brief analysis of its provisions, will be followed by
an investigation designed to ascertain (1) the validity of negli-
gence clauses inserted in bills of lading governed by the Brussels
Convention as enacted in the United States (domain of uni-
Iformity) ; and (2) the applicable law to similar clauses inserted
in bills of lading outside the scope of that convention (domain
of contractual freedom).
FROM CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM TO UNIFORM REGULATION
General Maritime Law
Under the law of the United States, as it existed until the
middle of the past century, the contract of affreightment was
generally enforceable according to its own terms. Since the
1880's, however, the American federal courts resolutely refused
to enforce "unreasonable" conditions inserted into bills of lading,
such as clauses which exempted the shipowner from liability for
his own or his servants' negligence.10
Contracts of affreightment involving significant foreign con-
tacts were governed by the law selected by the parties,20 and
in absence of agreement, by the law of the place of contracting2'
as impliedly intended.22 Nevertheless, unreasonable limitations
of liability contained in contracts which were to be performed
in part or in whole in the United States, were considered con-
porating the uniform rules. This technique is frequently used where litigation
is anticipated in a country applying the rules to "outward" trade only, or even in
a country applying them to both "inward" and "outward" trade, if the carriage
is between foreign ports. Cf. ZUEGER, DIE HAAGER REGELN YBER KONNOSSEMENTE
UND DAS RECHTLICHE SCHICKSAL DER WARE WAHREND DES SEETRANSPORTES 9
(1953). -
19. See Knauth, Transportation Law, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
538, 539 (1951).
20. The Oranmore, 24 Fed. 922 (D. Md. 1885) (giving effect to the intention
of the parties that English law be applied to a contract of affreightment concluded
in the United States for the carriage of goods to Liverpool). See also The Ken-
sington, 183 U.S. 263 (1902) ; Knott v. Botany Mills, 197 U.S. 69 (1900) ; The
Iowa, 50 Fed. 561 (D. Mass. 1892) ; Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass.
196, 202, 100 N.E. 1025 (1913).
21. Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397
(1889) (carriage of goods from New York to Liverpool, subject to the law of the
place of contracting, as impliedly intended). See Nolde, Les Conflits des Lois
Mariltimes en Droit Americain, 22 REV. DR. MAR. ComP. 36, 43 (1930) ; Knauth,
Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law, 49 CoL. L. REV. 1
(1949) ; Delaume, Note, REV. Ca. DR. INT. Pa. 214 (1950).
22. See Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S.
397 (1889) ; Nolde, supra note 21, at 43.
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trary to the public policy of the forum, 28 and of no effect,
whether American or foreign law governed.24
This legal regime did not successfully safeguard the interests
of American shippers, nor did it encourage the growth of Ameri-
can shipping industries ; and with a view to attaining such
aims, the Harter Act was passed in 1893.26
The Harter Act, 189327
The Harter Act, though originally conceived as an instru-
ment of international trade war,28 and as a concession to the
interests of American shippers, in fact worked a compromise
between shippers' and carriers' interests.29 Under that law,
clauses relieving the shipowner from liability for loss or dam-
age to the cargo arising from negligence were declared "null
and void and of no effect" ;30 but the shipowner was relieved
from liability for negligence "in navigation or in the manage-
ment" of the vessel, if he used due diligence to make his vessel
seaworthy.31
Initially designed to apply to foreign trade only,3 2 the Harter
Act was extended to cover domestic trade as well,3 3 and was
declared applicable to all shipments to and from the ports of
23. See The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1886) ; The Energia, 56
Fed. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 66 Fed. 604 (2d Cir. 1895); The Iowa, 50
Fed. 561, 563 (D. Mass. 1892). See also Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69
(1900).
24. Lewisohn v. National S.S. Co., 56 Fed. 602, 603 (E.D.N.Y. 1893); The
Energia, 56 Fed. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 66 Fed. 604 (2d Cir. 1895). See
The Guildhall, 58 Fed. 796, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1893). The foreign law could not "be
allowed to subvert in our courts our own positive law, founded upon public policy,
as respects contracts to be performed in part within our jurisdiction and in part
upon the high seas." Per Brown, J., in the district court, Botany Worsted Mills
v. Knott, 76 Fed. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1896). But cf. The Oranmore, 24 Fed. 922
(D. Md. 1885).
25. See The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459, 472, 473 (1896); COLINVAUX, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 3; KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 119. Cf. The Brantford
City, 29 Fed. 373, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
26. See The E. A. Shores Jr., 73 Fed. 342, 346 (E.D. Wis. 1896) ; COLINVAUX,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 3. See also KNAUTH, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 120, 121.
27. 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-195 (1953). See KNAUTH, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 120.
28. See The E. A. Shores Jr., 73 Fed. 342, 346 (E.D. Wis. 1896). Cf.
KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 120.
29. See Colinvaux, op. cit. supra note 4, at 3. Cf. Pan-Am. Trade and Credit
Corp. v. The Campfire, 156 F.2d 603, 605 (2d Cir. 1946) ; KNAUTH, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 121, 122; GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 125-26, §§ 3-25 (1957).
30. See 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1953).
31. 27 STAT. 445, 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1953).
32. See The E. A. Shores Jr., 73 Fed. 342, 344 (E.D. Wis. 1896) ; Knott v.
Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900) ; KNAUTH, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 121.
33. The Tampico, 151 Fed. 689 (N.D. Cal. 1907). See also Knott v. Botany
Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900).
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the United States. 4 This act, still in force insofar as not super-
seded by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936,35 plays an
important role in the regulation of both the domestic and the
international trade of the United States.
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 193686
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was enacted in view of
the pending ratification by the United States of the Brussels
Convention of 1924. The act reproduced, with some variations
of language,37 the text of Articles I to VIII of the Convention,
and, in addition, included several other provisions defining its
area of application and its relation to other legislation of the
United States. A brief summary of the most important provi-
sions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is here appropriate.
Subject-matter regulated. In accordance with the Brussels
Convention, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act regulates only
contracts of affreightment evidenced by bills of lading, and only
with regard to damages occurring between the time of loading
and discharge to cargo carried in the hull of the vessel; cargo
agreed to be carried on deck, and so carried, and carriage of live
animals are expressly exempted. 38
34. The Ferncliff, 22 F. Supp. 728 (D. Md. 1938) (Japan-New York) ; Navi-
gazione Libera Triestina v. Garcia and Maggini Co., 30 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1929)
(Costa Rica-San Franicisco, Cuba-Los Angeles). See also KNATJTH, Op. cit. supra
note 1, at 122; Delaume, supra note 21, at 214. But of. Louis-Dreyfuss v. Pater-
son Steamships, Ltd., 35 F.2d 353 (W.D.N.Y. 1929).
35. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, supersedes the Harter Act, 1893,
from "tackle to tackle" with regard to goods carried to or from the ports of the
United States, in foreign trade. See Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, 49
STAT. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1311 (1953) ; The Monte Iciar, 167 F.2d 334 (3d
Cir. 1948); Export S.S. Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y.
1938), reversed on other grounds, 106 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Mackey v. The
United States, 83 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 197 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1952). See also note 65 infra; KNAUTH, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 163. With re-
spect to the domestic trade, the parties are simply given option to subject the con-
tract to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, by express stipulation. See KNAUTII,
ibid.
36. 49 STAT. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1953). For its legislative his-
tory, see KNAUT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 128.
37. The textual variations between the act and the Brussels Convention were
made with the intention of clarifying the meaning of the Uniform Rules rather
than altering their effect. See Memorandum, State Department (June 5, 1937) :
"The foregoing differences from the Convention, made in the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, are intended primarily (1) to clarify provisions in the Conventior
which may be of uncertain meaning thereby avoiding expensive litigation in the
United States for purposes of interpretation and (2) to co-ordinate the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act with other legislation of the United States." 51 STAT. 269
(1937).
38. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 STAT. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C.
§ 1301(b) (c) (e) (1953).
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Substantive provisions. The act introduces into all bills of
lading covered by it certain standard clauses defining the risks
assumed by the carrier (which are absolute and irreducible)
and the immunities the carrier can enjoy (in absence of contrary
agreement). Clauses relieving the carrier from liability for neg-
ligence in the loading, handling, stowing, carrying, keeping, and
in the discharge of the goods are declared null and void; the
carrier, however, is relieved from liability arising from negli-
gence in the "navigation or management" of the vessel.8 9
Area of application. Section 13, first paragraph, of the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act, provides that "This Act shall apply
to all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of
the United States in foreign trade.
'40
Clause paramount. Section 13, last paragraph, provides that
"every bill of lading or similar document of title which is evi-
dence of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea from ports
of the United States, in foreign trade, shall contain a statement
that it shall have effect subject to the provisions of this Act. '41
In addition to passing this act, the United States deposited
its ratification of the Brussels Convention on June 29, 1937.
39. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 STAT. 1208, 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 1303, 1304 (1953).
40. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 STAT. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1312
(1953). The opening phrase of the act provides that "every bill of lading or sim-
ilar document of title which is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by
sea to or from ports of the United States, in Foreign trade, shall have effect
subject to the provisions of this Act." The two provisions have the same mean-
ing. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 152.
41. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 STAT. 1213 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1312
(1953), last paragraph. This "express statement" is commonly called the "clause
paramount." See FALCONBRIDGE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 398, note (k) (1954). No
case has been found involving an attempt to circumvent this provision; however,
as in Great Britain, failure to insert this clause in a bill of lading issued in the
United States will not entail its cancellation. See Vita Food Products v. Unus
Shipping Co. Ltd. (1939) A.C. 277 (P.C.). Without regard to any other contact,
or to contractual stipulations providing for the application of foreign law, the act
will be applied to all bills of lading coming under Section 13, first paragraph,
whether or not the parties have complied with the clause paramount requirement
of Section 13, last paragraph. See infra notes 51, 52; KNAUTH, Op. cit. supra
note 1, at 121 (1947 ed.); DoR, BILL OF LADING CLAUSES AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF BRUSSELS 24 (1956), citing The Ciano, 69 F. Supp. 35
(E.D. Pa. 1946) ; The Aakre, 122 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Shackman v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., 31 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). These cases are not con-
clusive. The Ciano involved a shipment from Spain to Philadelphia, and as the
bill of lading was issued outside the United States, the insertion of a clause
paramount was not compulsory. In the Aakre, the bill was also issued outside the
United States. Finally, in Shackman v. Cunard, where the bill of lading had been
issued in New York, the parties had actually complied with the act, and a clause
paramount was inserted into the bill of lading.
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The Brussels Convention
Textual variations between the Brussels Convention and the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, render necessary an investigation
with regard to the binding force of the Convention on courts
and individuals in the United States.
Under the United States Constitution, an international treaty
ratified by the President and the Senate, if self-executing, is
part of the law of the land.42 The Brussels Convention, however,
was ratified subject to an "understanding" that if the provisions
of the Convention and the provisions of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act should conflict, the act shall prevail over the Con-
vention.48 Thus, while undoubtedly a part of the law of the
United States, the Convention is not directly binding upon courts
and individuals; the law governing bills of lading is to be found
in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.44
As the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act incorporated, almost
literally, the substantive provisions of the Brussels Convention
(Articles I to VIII), the most important conflict between the
two texts concerns their intended area of application. Article X
of the Convention declares "The provisions of this Convention
shall apply to all bills of lading issued in any of the contracting
states" ;45 section 13 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, on
the other hand, makes the act applicable to contracts for the car-
riage of goods to or from the ports of the United States in for-
eign trade.
Like several other signatory countries, the United States has
thus departed from the system envisaged by the Brussels Con-
vention. Section 13 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act com-
pared to Article X of the Convention appears to be wider in
42. See KNAUTII, op. cit. supra note 1, at 153; Ransom, International Legisla-
tion and the American System, 22 TUL. L. REv. 547, 552 (1948) ; EHRENZWEIG-
FRAGISTAS-YIANNOPOULOS, AMERICAN-GREEK PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 12
(1957).
43. See Ratification of Convention by the United States, Second Understand-
ing. Ratification was advised and consented to April 1st, 1935 (with one under-
standing) and May 6, 1937 (with a second understanding) and deposited on June
29, 1937. Cf. KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 77.
44. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 153.
45. While in other countries (e.g., France) Article X of the Brussels Conven-
tion has been interpreted as a conflicts rule referring to the law of the place of
contracting, the same article has been explained in the United States as a promise
by each signatory country to apply the Convention to every (ocean) bill of lading
issued within its territory. See KNAUTH, op. Cit. supra note 1, at 152, 154. A sim-
ilar interpretation prevailed in England. See CARVER, CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA
ACT 207 (1952).
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scope with regard to some bills of lading, and narrower with
regard to others. Where the carriage is to or from the ports of
the United States in foreign trade, the act applies to bills of
lading issued in a non-signatory country; but it does not apply
to bills of lading issued in another signatory country where the
carriage is between foreign ports, or to bills of lading issued in
the United States for the carriage of goods between American
ports.
However, since according to the Protocol of Signature the
High Contracting Parties were given option to exclude from the
uniform regulation their domestic trade, deviation from the Con-
vention is actually made only with regard to bills of lading
issued in a signatory country for the carriage of goods between
foreign ports. Such bills of lading according to Article X should
be subject to the Convention as a matter of law. According to
the American practice they are subject to the Convention only
where the latter is contractually incorporated, or where the con-
tract is localized in a country adhering to the Convention. While
in such cases the carriers may have an opportunity to limit their
liabilities contrary to the letter and spirit of the Brussels Con-
vention, it cannot be seriously contended that the American prac-
tice prejudices the achievement of international uniformity.
Such cases are rare; and the American courts may well resort
to the law of the place of contracting or even decline jurisdic-
tion and thus relegate the parties to a forum abroad which would
apply the Convention to the bill of lading in question.48
THE DOMAIN OF UNIFORMITY: No CHOICE OF LAW
It is well settled in the United States that all bills of lading
covering carriage of hull cargo (other than live animals) to or
from the ports of the United States in foreign trade, from the
time of loading until discharge, are subject to the Brussels Con-
vention as incorporated into the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.4
46. Cf. infra notes 58, 65, 77-79.
47. See notes 38-40 supra. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act has been con-
sistently applied to such bills of lading, irrespective of all other contacts. See
Pan-Am Trade and Credit Corp. v. The Campfire, 156 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1946)
(New York-Ecuador) ; Granadaisa Foods v. Compania de Navegacao Carregadores
Acoreanos, 139 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) (Portugal-New York); Remington
Rand Inc. v. American Export Lines, 132 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (New
York-Bombay); Shackman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 31 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.
N.Y. 1940) (New York-London) ; Kroll v. Silver Line, 116 F. Supp. 443 (N.D.
Cal. 1953) (India-United States) ; Kupfermann v. United States, 227 F.2d 348
(2d Cir. 1955) (Persian Gulf-New York) ; The Ciano, 69 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa.
1946) (Spain-Philadelphia) ; The Steel Inventor, 35 F. Supp. 986 (D. Md. 1940)
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Any clause inserted into such bills of lading exonerating the
carrier or the ship from liability for negligence (other than in
the navigation or management of the vessel), or lessening that
liability otherwise than as provided in the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, is null and void.4 8
However, apart from agreements directly exonerating the
carrier from liability for negligence, exoneration may be at-
tempted by clauses stipulating the application of a more favor-
able foreign law or by clauses granting exclusive jurisdiction to
the courts of a foreign country.49
Stipulation of the applicable law. Following the long estab-
lished precedent of the Harter Act, Section 13, first paragraph
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act5" has been interpreted as a
rule of public policy which precludes any other choice of law
with regard to bills of lading coming under it. Thus a stipula-
(India-Norfolk, Va.) ; Sociedade Brasileira de Intercambio Commercial e Indus-
trial, Ltd. v. Punta del Este, 135 F. Supp. 394 (D. N.J. 1955) (New Orleans-
Brazil) ; Export S.S. Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1938),
reversed on other grounds, 106 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1939) (Black Sea-New York);
The Zarembo, 44 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1943) (West Africa-New York); The Argentino, 28 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y.
1939) (New York-Buenos Aires); The Asturias, 40 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y.
1941), aff'd, 126 F.2d 999 (2d Cir' 1942) (Brazil-New York) ; Scarburgh v.
.Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, 174 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1949) (Colombia-
New York) ; Lowendahl v. Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission, 32 N.Y.S.2d
744 (City Ct. N.Y. 1942) (New York-Brazil) ; Mackey v. The United States, 83
F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 197 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1952) (Haiti-Louisi-
ana) ; Anglo-American Fur Merchant Corp. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 1000
(S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Archangel-New York).
48. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 STAT. 1209 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8)
(1953). Cf. note 50 inIra.
49. See The Energia, 56 Fed. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 66 Fed. 604 (2d
Cir. 1895) ("The objections to the validity of stipulations exempting common car-
riers from responsibility for negligence . . .apply precisely the same to a stipula-
tion for the adoption of the law of another country. . .. That stipulation is
plainly nothing but a . . . device) ; De la Grassiere, La Clause d'un Connaisse-
ment attributive de Compdtence d un Tribunal Etranger, D.M.F. 119, 122 (1952).
Jurisdictional clauses should be distinguished from clauses providing for arbitra-
tion whether in the United States or abroad. Such clauses are valid under both
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the United States Arbitration Act, 61 STAT.
669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (Supp. IV 1957), and are enforceable according to
their own terms. See Uniao de Transportadores Para Importacao e Commercio,
Ltd. v. Compania de Navegacao Corregadores Accoreanos, 84 F. Supp. 582
(E.D.N.Y. 1949) (upholding the validity of a clause providing for arbitration in
,Portugal with respect to disputes arising in connection with the carriage of goods
from New York to that country). See also Shanferoke Coal v. Westchester Service
Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1953) ; American Creosoting Co. v. Beechwood, A.M.C. 1485
(1937) ; International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 93 F. Supp.
798 (D. Md. 1950). Cf. KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 238; Poor, Arbitration
under the Federal Statute, 36 YALE L.J. 667 (1927).
50. See supra text at note 40. Quite apart from the interpretation given to
this section, it seems that Section 3(8) would be sufficient to preclude the appli-
cation of foreign law to bills of lading covered by the act where the foreign law
would. "lessen" the liability of the carrier. Cf. supra text at note 48.
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tion providing for the application of foreign law to a bill of lad-
ing covered by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act will be disre-
garded and the liability of the carrier will be determined under
the act. In a typical case involving carriage between Indian and
American ports under a bill of lading providing for application
of Indian law, the American court declared that "It is clear
enough as a matter of law that the responsibility of the carrier
in this case is to be determined by the provisions of the (Car-
riage of Goods by Sea) Act."5 1 And in another case involving
carriage from Brazil to New York, under a bill of lading which
was actually made subject to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
the court said that the act "would anyhow have been applicable
as a matter of law as the voyage was from a foreign port to the
United States. ' 52
Jurisdictional agreements. The issue of the validity58 of ju-
risdictional agreements inserted into bills of lading covered by
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is somewhat confusing due to
the peculiar views of the United States courts with regard to
their admiralty jurisdiction. A brief analysis of the rules gov-
erning that jurisdiction is thus necessary.
The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts is
largely discretionary, and is exercised or declined according to
considerations of convenience of courts and parties. 54 Contrac-
51. The Steel Inventor, supra note 47. See also Knauth, op. cit. supra note 1, at
154. Cf. The Kensington, supra note 20, deciding the matter under the Harter Act.
It should be noted that while there are some cases purporting to attach signifi-
cance to the law selected by the parties in bills of lading covered by the Harter
Act, in no case was foreign law actually applied. See The Ferneliff, supra note
34, where bills of lading issued in Japan for carriage of goods to the United
States provided for application of Japanese law. There was language indicating
that Japanese law was controlling; but, in absence of proof, the court indulged
in the presumption that the law of Japan was identical with that of the United
States. For other cases where foreign law was presumed to be identical with the
forum law, see Franklin Fire Ins. C. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 54 F.2d
807 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) ; The Miguel di Larrinaga, 217 Fed. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) ;
Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Broklebank, 148 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1945). Cf. E.
Gerli and Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
52. The Bill, 47 F. Supp. 969, 975 (D. Md. 1942). See also Comment, 58
COL. L. REv. 212, 218 (1958).
53. The term "validity" of a jurisdiction clause is rather misleading. One
might expect that a "valid" clause should be given effect always, and that the
-parties to such an agreement should be relegated to their selected forum. This,
-however, is not the case. The United States' courts sitting in admiralty may re-
tain jurisdiction, though the clause itself is perfectly valid. It is therefore prefer-
able to discuss in terms of actual result, namely, whether or not a jurisdictional
clause inserted into a bill of lading will be given effect.
54. See K16eckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, 210
F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Bengochea v. Dampskib Selskabet Orient, 1 F. Supp. 934
(S.D.N.Y. 1931) ; St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. S.S. Republica de Vene-
zuela, 105 F. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; The Harfry, 39 F. Supp. 893 (D.N.J.
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tual stipulations granting exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of
a foreign country are not binding upon the courts ;', "reason-
able" jurisdictional agreements, however, may be enforced at the
discretion of the court,56 by a decision declining to exercise ju-
risdiction.5 7 In such cases, it is apparent that considerations of
convenience weigh heavily in the determination of the "reason-
ableness" of the agreement.5
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act contains no provision re-
lating to jurisdiction or to the validity of jurisdictional agree-
ments.59 But if such agreements were to be generally enforce-
able, the carrier would be able to effect a change in the appli-
cable law by selecting a forum, and thus, indirectly, succeed in
limiting his liability under the act.60 It seems, therefore, that a
1941) (jurisdiction retained) ; Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. The Alabama, 109
F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); The Tricolor, 1 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1932),
aff'd sub nom. United States Merchants' and Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den
Norske Afrika og Australie Line, 65 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1932) (jurisdiction de-
clined). In some cases, however, arising under modern statutory law, admiralty
jurisdiction is considered "mandatory" and is exercised without regard to consid-
erations of convenience and irrespective of contractual stipulations to the con-
trary. See EITRENZWEIG-FRAGISTAS-YIANNOPOULOS, op. cit. supra note 42, at 44,
47, with regard to cases arising under the Seamen's and Jones Acts.
55. See Sociedade Brasileira de Intercambio Commercial e Industrial, Ltd. v.
Punta del Este, 135 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.J. 1955); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co. v. S.S. Republica de Venezuela, 105 F. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (jurisdic-
tion retained in spite of agreement conferring exclusive jurisdiction to foreign
courts). In the past, several courts have taken the position that jurisdictional
clauses were void. See The Edam, 27 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) ; Wood and
Selick Inc. v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir.
1930), 46 YALE L.J. 1150 (1936).
56. See Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. The Alabama, 109 F. Supp. 856
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; The Tricolor, 1 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). See also Cerro
de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951), 65 HARV.
L. REv. 184 (1952); Muller and Co. v. Swedish-American Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d
806 (2d Cir. 1955) ; The Iquitos, 286 Fed. 383 (W.D. Wash. 1921) ; Comment,
58 COL. L. REV. 212, 219 (1958).
57. Specific performance of the agreement as such cannot be granted. Cf. Cerro
de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951), note by
the court: "It might be said that the court took jurisdiction and granted specific
performance of Clause 12 of the bill on the ground that that provision was fair
and not against public policy, all the facts considered."
58. See Muller and Co. v. Swedish-American Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1955): "We come therefore to the consideration of the reasonableness of this
particular agreement in the setting of this case. The 'Oklahoma' was not only
Swedish owned . . . it also was constructed in that country. All the members of
the 'Oklahoma's' crew reside in Sweden." See also St. Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co. v. Republica de Venezuela, 105 F. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Sociedade
Brasileira de Intercambio Commercial e Industrial v. Punta del Este, 135 F. Supp.
394 (D.N.J. 1955) ; The Iquitos, 286 Fed. 383 (W.D. Wash. 1921) ; Muzillo Ltda.
v. The Bio Bio, 217 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.
1955) ("the factors determinative of an inconvenient forum largely turn upon
identical ones involved in the unreasonableness of a stipulation").
59. Muller and Co. v. Swedish American Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1955). Cf. KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 238.
60. The choice of forum is in effect a choice of law. See United States Mer-
chants and Shippers Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske Afrika Og Australie Line, 65
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jurisdictional clause inserted into a bill of lading covered by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act should be given effect, apart
from considerations of convenience, only where the foreign
forum would apply to the controversy a law no more favorable
to the carrier than that of the United States. And this is actual-
ly what the American courts have done under the doctrine that
the jurisdictional clause must be "reasonable" to be enforced,
though the real issue was often obscured by confused language
failing to distinguish clearly between the validity of the stipula-
tion under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the exercise
of discretion according to the rules of forum non conveniens.
In the leading case of Muller and Co. v. Swedish American
Line, Ltd.,61 a Swedish vessel carrying cargo from Sweden to
Philadelphia was lost at sea, and the American consignee sued
the carrier for damages. A clause in the bill of lading provided
for the settlement of all disputes in Sweden, under Swedish law;
and the defendant, relying on that clause, moved for a dismissal.
The plaintiff argued that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was
proprio vigore applicable to the contract of carriage, and that,
under this act, the jurisdictional clause was invalid as "relieving
the carrier or the ship from liability." The court, though agree-
ing that the contract was subject to the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, granted the motion to dismiss.
The decision was based on the ground that the agreement was
"reasonable" (under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act) as not
''necessarily relieving the carrier or the ship from liability" and
on a finding that the courts of Sweden would offer a convenient
forum for the controversy. "There was an undisputed showing,"
the court concluded, "that the Swedish courts apply the same
measure of damages as American Maritime Courts, and that
limitation proceedings under Swedish law will be no more re-
strictive than under American law on libellant's recovery.
Further, there is no contention that the Swedish courts are not
capable of adjudicating this case fairly and justly."62
F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1933) ("the choice of a court may be more important than
many of the express terms of the contract; may indeed be determinative of the
outcome").
61. See note 56 supra.
62. 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1955). See also Murillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio,
127 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955) ("with
respect to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1300 et 8eq., as gov-
erning law, there is nothing that in widespread application by foreign courts in
marine controversies cannot be matched by the tribunals of a maritime country
such as Sweden").
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No such reasonableness was found to exist in the more re-
cent case of Sociedade Brasileira de Intercampio Commercial e
Industrial, Ltda. v. Punte del Este.63 In this case, wheat shipped
from New Orleans to Santos, Brazil, reached its destination in
a damaged condition, and the consignee (a Uruguayan corpora-
tion) sued the carrier (a New York corporation) to recover the
loss. The vessel belonged to an agency of the Government of
Uruguay which chartered it to another Uruguayan corporation,
and the latter sub-chartered the same to the New York defend-
ant. All charter-parties included a provision that any dispute
was to be settled in the courts of Uruguay under the law of that
country, and this provision was incorporated by reference into
the bill of lading issued by the sub-charterer in New York. The
same bill of lading, however, provided that the contract of af-
freightment should be subject to the (United States) Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act.
The court, passing upon defendant's motion to dismiss, de-
cided to retain jurisdiction. The court found that the reference
to Uruguay law had been modified by the incorporation of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (an irrelevant fact since the act
was applicable as a matter of law), and held the jurisdictional
clause to be "unreasonable" in view of the (equally irrelevant)
fact that the controversy was to be settled in a non-neutral6 4
forum. 5 The truly determinative fact that, if the parties were
to be relegated to the courts of Uruguay the carrier would suc-
ceed in "lessening" his liabilities in a contract clearly governed
by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, was not mentioned.
63. See note 55 supra. See also Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Compania Colonial de
Navegacao, 121 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (Portugal).
64. In Muller and Co. v. Swedish-American Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1955), the parties were relegated to the courts of Sweden, certainly not a neutral
forum. The court in Sociedade Brasileira de Intercambio Commercial e Indus-
trial, Ltd. v. Punta del Este, 135 F. Supp. 394 (D.N.J. 1955) also declared that
discretion to dismiss is exercised only where the jurisdictional agreement is coupled
with a stipulation of the applicable law; while this is at best doubtful, in the
instant case, there was express reference to the law of Uruguay. See also Murillo
Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.E. 1955), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d
Cir. 1955) ; Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir.
1951) ; The Tricolor, 1 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
65. No case has been found where jurisdiction was declined in a controversy
arising under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, in absence of an agreement con-
ferring exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of a foreign country. If such a case
ever arises, it is to be expected that the courts, among other considerations, will
take into account the law which the foreign courts would apply to the case. It
seems, therefore, that as to bills of lading covered by the Uniform Rules, jurisdic-
tion will be exercised or declined, whether or not the bill of lading includes a
jurisdictional agreement, (1) according to considerations of convenience; and (2)
after an examination with respect to the law that the foreign court would apply
to the case.
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THE DOMAIN OF CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM: CHOICE OF LAW
While contracts of affreightment regulated by,6 and within
the area of application of,67 the Harter Act and the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act are as a matter of law governed by these acts
and no other choice of law may be made by courts or parties,68
contracts of affreightment outside the scope of these acts are
governed by the conflicts rules which the federal courts apply
in maritime cases.6 9
The wide delimitation of the Harter Act and of the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act leaves little room for application of other
law with regard to contracts which, though involving questions
regulated by these acts, fall outside their area of application. In
fact, application of other law is possible only in the rare case
involving contracts for the carriage of goods between foreign
ports.70 It is thus with regard to matters and contracts not regu-
lated by either act, such as carriage under charter-party,71 or
66. Both the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Harter Act regulate only
contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading. See Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 49 STAT. 1208, 46 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1953) ; Harter Act, 27 STAT. 445, 446
(1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190, 191, 193, 194 (1953). Cf. text at note 38 supra.
67. Both the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Harter Act apply to the
carriage of goods to or from the ports of the United States in foreign trade. See
notes 34, 40, supra. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act covers the time between
loading and discharge; the Harter Act applies from the time the goods have been
taken under the custody of the carrier until their delivery to the shipper or con-
signee. See Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, tit. I, § 1(e) ; Mackey v. The United
States, 83 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 197 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1952)
(cargo shipped from Haiti to Louisiana, damaged while awaiting loading). The
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act may be made applicable to the time preceding load-
ing and following discharge, or to the domestic trade, by agreement of the parties.
See Mackey v. The United States, supra. Neither act applies to the carriage of
goods between the ports of foreign countries. See Galban Lobo Trading Co. S/A
v. The Diponegoro, 108 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Havana-Israel) ; Franklin
Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 54 F.2d 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1931)
(Haiti-Antwerp) ; Petition of Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953) (Ger-
many-Korea) ; Murillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955) (Antwerp-Chile) ; The Fri, 154 Fed. 333 (2d
Cir. 1907) (Colombia-Cuba). Of. KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 155, citing
The Miguel di Larrinaga, 217 Fed. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). In that case, a shipment
of goods was made from Liverpool to Guantanamo, aboard a British vessel, under
a bill of lading providing for the application of English law to the contract of
carriage. The court, disregarding all these facts, held the Harter Act applicable
by relying on a presumption that the law of the place of injury (Cuba) was the
same as that of the United States.
68. See text at note 51 supra.
69. See EERENZWEIG-FRAGISTAS-YIANNOPOULOS, op. cit. supra note 42, at 60
et seq.; Nolde, supra note 21, at 36; Stumberg, Commercial Paper and the Con-flict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. RaV. 489 (1953).
70. See Petition of Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Franklin
Ins. Co. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 54 F.2d 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) ; Cerro
de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951). See also
KNAUTH, op. Cit. supra note 1, at 155. See note 67 supra.
71. Cf. note 66 supra. Neither act deals with questions relating to the form
of the bill of lading, the capacity of the parties, and the construction of the con-
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with regard to exempted shipments, 72 that resort to conflicts
rules is frequently made.7S
The validity of "negligence" clauses inserted into this cate-
gory of contracts will primarily depend on the law selected by
the parties.74 It is beyond the purpose of this paper to discuss
the limits of the parties' "autonomy" to select the applicable
law. 75 It suffices, perhaps, to notice that the American courts
will ordinarily give effect to such a stipulation inserted into a
bill of lading outside the scope of either the Harter Act or the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.7 6 And if the parties incorporate
tract of affreightment; such questions will be determined according to the gen-
eral conflicts rules. Cf. note 69 supra; The Ferncliff, 22 F. Supp. 728 (D. Md.
1938) ; Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Brocklebank, 148 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1945)
(Alexandria-Philadelphia). The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, provides
for a period of limitation of one year. Section 3(6). The Harter Act, 1893, had
no similar provision. Thus, prior to the enactment of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, contractual agreements providing for a period of limitation, if "reason-
able," were given effect according to the law selected by the parties or according
to the law of the place of contracting. See Switzerland Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nay.
Libera Triestina, 91 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1937) (carriage of cheese from Italy to
New York; clause providing for a twelve-month period of limitation was "reason-
able" and given effect under the incorporated British Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 1924). For a case involving limitation of actions under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 1936, see The Argentino, 28 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(New York-Buenos Aires).
72. Live animals and deck cargo have been exempted from the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act. See Title I, Section 1(c) ; supra text at note 20. The Harter
Act applies to deck cargo, and only Sections 1 to 4 have been declared inap-
plicable to the transportation of live animals. See Harter Act, Section 7. It is
clear that the parties may stipulate the application of either act as to exempted
cargoes. See Uniao de Transportadores Para Importacao e Comercio, Ltda. v.
Compania de Navegacao Corregadores Accoreanos, 84 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.N.Y.
1949) (deck cargo from New York to Portugal, subject to the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, as contractually incorporated).
73. Cf. Knauth, supra note 21; Nolde, 8upra note 21.
74. See Petition of Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Switzerland
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nay. Libera Triestina, 91 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1937). Under the
Harter Act, see The Fri, 154 Fed. 333 (2d Cir. 1907) (giving effect to the in-
tention of the parties that Colombian law be applied to a carriage of live animals
from Colombia to Cuba) ; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet
Co., 54 F.2d 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). But cf. The Miguel di Larrinaga, 217 Fed.
678 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (the Harter Act applied to a bill of lading covering carriage
of goods from Liverpool to Guantanamo, against the express intention of the par-
ties). See text at note 20 supra.
75. The question of the power of the parties to a contract to select the ap-
plicable law is the subject of great difference of opinion in various countries. See
Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 AM J. ComP. L. 341 (1952) ; FALCON-
BRIDGE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 402, 406 (1954); Falconbridge, Bils of Lading:
Proper Law and Renvoi, 18 CAN. B. REV. 77 (1940) ; Comment, 58 COL. L. REV.
212, 217 (1958).
76. See notes 20, 72, supra; Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d
189 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Brocklebank, 148 F.2d 727 (3d
Cir. 1945). But cf. Gerli and Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
In cases covered by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, such a stipulation is in-
effectual. Cf. notes 47, 51, 52, supra. Under the Harter Act, too, such a stipula-
tion should be ineffectual. But cf. Dreyfuss v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 35 F.2d
353 (W.D.N.Y. 1929). In that case, a bill of lading covering shipment of grain
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into the contract the Brussels Convention as enacted in the
United States,77 or in any other country, 78 the American courts
will give effect to the stipulation like any other contract pro-
vision.7 9
In absence of stipulation as to the applicable law, the liability
of the carrier, and the validity of exoneration clauses, will be
determined according to the law of the place of contracting,"
or that of performance,8 ' as impliedly intended.
Finally, jurisdictional clauses8 2 granting exclusive jurisdic-
from Minnesota to Montreal, Canada, aboard a Canadian vessel, included a clause
incorporating the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act. The court said that as
the vessel was plying between Canadian ports "the provisions of the Harter Act
probably do not apply," and proceeded to give effect to a contractual exemption
from liability under the law of Canada. It was pointed out, however, that "the
Water Carriage of Goods Act of Canada has provisions similar to the Harter
Act" and that the contractual exemption was valid under both laws. In The
Aakre, 122 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1941), the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods
Act was incorporated in a contract for the carriage of goods from St. John to
American ports (semble). The issue was whether the ship was seaworthy, and
this was decided, without discussion, under American law. The law of Canada
does not seem to have 'been considered at all.
77. It was held in The Edmund Fanning, 105 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act may not be contractually incorporated in
contracts covering carriage of goods between foreign ports. The case was modified,
sub nom. Petition of Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953). Cf. Murillo
Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d
Cir. 1955).
78. See Switzerland Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nay. Libera Triestina, 91 F.2d 960
(2d Cir. 1937) (British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, incorporated in a
contract covering carriage of goods between Italy and the United States, at a
time when the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, had not yet
come into effect). See also Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet
Co., 54 F.2d 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Dreyfuss v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 35
F.2d 353 (W.D.N.Y. 1929).
79. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 155. Professor Knauth suggests,
further, that the American courts, on comity grounds, will read the Brussels
Convention as contractually incorporated in bills of lading issued in a country
adhering to that Convention. This is doubtful. Cf. note 72 supra; Petition of
Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953) (bill of lading issued in Germany,
a signatory country, subject to the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
as contractually incorporated).
80. The Fri, 154 Fed. 333 (2d Cir. 1907). Of. Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp.
v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951).
81. See Nolde, supra note 21, at 42, 44; BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1187,
1188 (1935). Cf. Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1951). See also The Miguel di Larrinaga, 217 Fed. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1914)
(seemingly applying the law of the place of injury).
82. Jurisdictional agreements were given effect in Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp.
v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951) (shipment of goods from Peru to
Antwerp under a bill of lading providing for the settlement of any dispute in
Norway according to Norwegian law; decision based on the ground that the
American forum was a forum non conveniens and that the jurisdictional clause
was valid under the law of the place of contracting and the law of the place where
the dispute was to be settled) ; The Tricolor, 1 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1932)
(shipment of goods from Hamburg to Shanghai under a bill of lading conferring
jurisdiction on the courts of Norway and providing for the application of Nor-
wegian law) ; Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. The Alabama, 109 F. Supp. 856
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tion to the courts of a foreign country, will be given effect ac-
cording to considerations of convenience, and according to their
validity under the law of the place of contracting and that of
the place where the dispute is to be settled,83 rather than accord-
ing to their "reasonableness" under the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act.84
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. The American courts, without regard to the law govern-
ing the contract of affreightment, have in the past declined to
enforce "unreasonable" clauses limiting the liability of the car-
rier for negligence, where performance was to be made in part
or in whole in the United States.
2. Today, bills of lading covering transportation of goods
between the ports of the United States are governed by the Har-
ter Act, 1893; bills of lading covering transportation of goods
between ports of the United States and ports of foreign coun-
tries are governed in part by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
1936, and in part by the Harter Act. Both acts apply without
regard to any other contact, and contrary contractual stipula-
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (shipment of goods from Peru to Antwerp under a bill of lading
providing for the settlement of disputes in France according to the law of the
State of New York). Of. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. S.S. Republica
de Venezuela, 105 F. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (shipment from Antwerp to
Ecuador, on a Venezuelan vessel, under a bill of lading providing for the settle-
ment of disputes in Amsterdam under Belgium law; jurisdiction retained partly
on the ground of forum conveniens, and partly on the ground that the jurisdic-
tional clause was invalid under both Dutch and Belgium law). See also The
Iquitos, 286 Fed. 383 (W.D. Wash. 1921); The Muzillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio,
127 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955).
83. See Murillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
("such provision is alleged to be valid under Swedish and Chilean law, and not
claimed to be otherwise under the laws of Bolivia and Belgium") ; Cerro do Pasco
Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951) ; St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co. v. S.S. Republica de Venezuela, 105 V. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). No case was found where, in absence of agreement, jurisdiction was de-
clined in a controversy arising under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. But juris-
diction was declined, even in absence of such an agreement, in Galban Lobo
Trading Co. v. The Diponegoro, 108 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), involving a
shipment between foreign countries. Cf. Bengochea v. Dampskib Selskabet Orient,
1 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (shipment from Siam to Cuba, on a Danish
vessel; jurisdiction retained).
84. Cf. text at notes 59-60 supra. In contrast to cases in which the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act is proprio vigore applicable, contractual incorporation of the
act in bills of lading not covered by it is not determinative in the exercise of
jurisdiction. See Murillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Galban Lobo Trading Co. v. The Diponegoro,
108 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The American courts will exercise or decline
jurisdiction in such case according to considerations of convenience of courts and
parties. See Galban Lobo Trading Go. v. The Diponegoro, supra; Bengochea v.
Dampskib Selskabet Orient, 1 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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tions aiming, directly or indirectly, at relieving the carrier from
liability for negligence are invalid.
3. Bills of lading covering carriage of goods between the
ports of foreign countries, whether signatory or not of the Brus-
sels Convention, are outside the scope of either the Harter Act
or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Such bills of lading are
governed by the law selected by the parties, and, in absence of
agreement, by the law of the place of contracting or of perform-
ance; clauses limiting the liability of the carrier for negligence
will be given effect in such cases according to the applicable law.
4. The only deviation from the system envisaged by the
Brussels Convention is made by the United States in connection
with bills of lading issued in a signatory country for the carriage
of goods to a country other than the United States. Such bills
of lading should be subject to the convention as a matter of law.
But since such cases are not an ordinary occurrence, and since
the parties may incorporate the Brussels Convention by contract
the American practice does not seriously impair the achievement
of international uniformity.
